Malicious Software and Hardware in Internet of Things
May 1, 2019, Alghero, Italy
8:30-9:30 Keynote (Moderator: Francesco Regazzoni)
|Detecting and counteracting benign faults and malicious attacks in cyber physical systems|
|Professor Israel Koren (University of Massachusetts at Amherst)|
Abstract The use of cyber-physical system (CPS) is rapidly expanding and many of their
applications require a highly reliable and secure implementation as they
control critical infrastructures or even life-critical devices.
Unfortunately, current techniques for achieving high reliability and security
incur high overheads. In particular, integrating countermeasures against
security attacks is problematic as security threats are often not well defined,
evolve continuously, and as a result, many CPSs often remain vulnerable.
We propose to exploits the physical plant state information to enhance both
reliability and security. Our approach, which monitors the controlled plant
state trajectory, allows for tunable fault-tolerance as well as detection of
malicious attacks, and it achieves these at a low overhead.
The plant state space consists of safe and marginal state subspaces. In the
safe subspace the CPS will continue its safe operation even if the worst case
control signal is applied. In contrast, any erroneous control applied when the
plant state is marginal, may lead to a catastrophic system failure. Such an
erroneous control output may be due to either a benign fault or a malicious
security attack. As most of the time the plant will be deep within its safe
subspace, we can avoid using expensive redundancy techniques and thus, reduce
the computational load while still guaranteeing safe operation. When a marginal
state of the plant is detected, it will signal the potential presence of a
"natural" fault or malicious attack. Our scheme will counter this by switching
to a critical mode involving higher levels of redundancy to combat natural
failures as well as alternative mechanisms to defeat malicious attacks.
A major challenge in our approach is to determine, in real-time, whether the
current state of the physical plant is deep within its safe sub-space or is
marginal. We have used various machine learning techniques for classifying the
state and our results indicate that with a reasonable number of entries in a
lookup table and with a short execution time, the required classification can
be performed efficiently.
Short Bio Israel Koren is a Professor Emeritus of Electrical and Computer Engineering at
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst and a fellow of the IEEE.
He has been a consultant to companies like IBM, Analog Devices, Intel, AMD and
National Semiconductors. His research interests include Fault-Tolerant systems,
cyber-physical systems, secure cryptographic devices, Computer architecture
and computer arithmetic.
He publishes extensively and has over 300 publications in refereed journals and
conferences. He is the author of the textbook "Computer Arithmetic Algorithms,"
2nd Edition, A.K. Peters, Ltd., 2002, and a co-author of the textbook
"Fault Tolerant Systems," Morgan-Kaufman, 2007.
9:30-10:00 Session One (Moderator: Paolo Palmieri)
|Examining the Practical Side Channel Resilience of ARX-boxes|
|Yan Yan and Elisabeth Oswald|
10:00 - 10:40 Round Table (Moderator: Ilia Polian)
|Round table introductory talk: Nano Security: From Nano-Electronics to Secure Systems|
|Ilia Polian (University of Stuttgart)|
|10:25-10:40 Open Discussion|
10:40-11:10 Coffee Break
11:10-12:45 Session two (Moderator: Georg Becker)
|A privacy-preserving protocol for indoor Wi-Fi localization|
|Samuel N. Eshun and Paolo Palmieri|
|Highway to HAL|
|Sebastian Wallat, Nils Albartus, Steffen Becker, Maik Ender, Max Hoffmann, Marc Fyrbiak, Adrian Drees, Sebastian Maaßen and Christof Paar|
|A Secure and Authenticated Host to Memory Communication Interface|
|Niccolò Izzo, Paolo Amato, Alessandro Barenghi, Luca Breveglieri and Gerardo Pelosi|
12:40-12:45 Closing Remarks (Georg Becker and Francesco Regazzoni)